
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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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### EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Moscow last week continued to criticize the Western powers for their alleged failure to undertake specific steps to assure the success of the summit conference. Commenting on the meeting of the Western foreign ministers in Washington, Soviet propaganda adopted the general line that the West has limited itself to words and has failed to realize that "originality of views" is the primary prerequisite for success at the summit.

Pravda again used Secretary Herter's 4 April speech

as the basis for detailed criticism of the Western position on disarmament and Germany, and Izvestia on 16 April took a similar approach by citing a Walter Lippmann article as indicative of the official Western intention to avoid definitive decisions at the heads-of-government meeting.

Timed to counter the Western ministers' communiqués and press reports that the West will propose a German plebiscite on whether a peace treaty should be signed with a united Germany

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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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or separate German states, both Pravda and Izvestia sharply rejected the plebiscite concept in either Berlin or Germany. Both papers also repeated the USSR's threat to sign a separate treaty if it fails to find understanding from the Western leaders on the Soviet proposal for a treaty with both Germa-Izvestia added that "no one should entertain any illusions" that when such action is taken, "all rights arising from the defeat of Germany will lapse in all territory over which East Germany has sovereignty."

#### Berlin

Pravda on 14 April revived the proposal for an interim solution to Berlin's status. response to Herter's statement tying Berlin to German unification, Pravda claimed that the possibility for agreement on Berlin--"even if provisional and partial" -- became possible at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference, but only after the West had discarded its package proposals. Posing the question as to why the "positive experience" achieved at Geneva should be written off, Pravda asserted that these negotiatrons "came quite close" to framing individual provisions for an interim agreement.

Moscow's renewed emphasis on the interim agreement provided the signal for an East German initiative on 17 April in the form of a letter from Ulbricht to West German workers. Ulbricht indicated that as a measure to establish confidence, East Germany could agree to an interim solution which would include a restriction on "hostile" propaganda activity in West Berlin, a ban on stationing atomic weapons in the city, the gradual reduction of Western

troops, and the step-by-step abolition of the occupation status. The Ulbricht proposal corresponds closely to the terms for an interim agreement advanced by Gromyko at the Geneva meeting.

The East German letter makes no specific link between an interim solution and the establishment of an all-German commission, but in a speech on the same day, and in a television interview on 20 April, Ulbricht referred to the possibility of summit agreement to form such a commission based on parity of representation.

Although the bloc has concentrated over the past several months on the original Soviet proposals to convert West Berlin into a free city, the concept of an interim solution was never dropped completely. memorandum delivered in mid-January by Soviet Ambassador Smirnov to the West German Social Democrats mentioned the development of a free city by stages, and the Moscow Declaration of the Warsaw Pact countries on 4 February criticized Western attempts to "cancel" the achievements of the Geneva negotiations. Again, in late March, Smirnov publicly assumed that the summit negotiations would begin at the point where the Geneva discussions ended.


East German politburo member Verner on 27 March asserted that an interim solution was possible "on the road to a demilitarized free city," adding that such a solution should include guarantees against the use of West Berlin as a center for propaganda against the "socialist states." As the summit approaches, this proposal will probably occupy a more prominent place in Soviet comments on the Berlin issue.

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